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ABSTRACT
While the introduction of differential privacy has been a major
breakthrough in the study of privacy preserving data publication,
some recent work has pointed out a number of cases where it is
not possible to limit inference about individuals. The dilemma that
is intrinsic in the problem is the simultaneous requirement of data
utility in the published data. Differential privacy does not aim to
protect information about an individual that can be uncovered even
without the participation of the individual. However, this lack of
coverage may violate the principle of individual privacy. Here we
propose a solution by providing protection to sensitive information,
by which we refer to the answers for aggregate queries with small
counts. Previous works based on ℓ-diversity can be seen as pro-
viding a special form of this kind of protection. Our method is
developed with another goal which is to provide differential pri-
vacy guarantee, and for that we introduce a more refined form of
differential privacy to deal with certain practical issues. Our empir-
ical studies show that our method can preserve better utilities than a
number of state-of-the-art methods although these methods do not
provide the protections that we provide.
1. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate source of the problem with privacy preserving data
publishing is that we must also consider the utility of the published
data. The problem is intriguing to begin with because we have a
pair of seemingly contradictory goals of utility and privacy. When-
ever we are able to provide some useful information with the pub-
lished data, there is the question of privacy breach because of that
information.
The statistician Tore Dalenius advocated the following privacy
goal in [8]: Anything that can be learned about a respondent from
the statistical database should be learnable without access to the
database. To aim for this goal, some previous works have consid-
ered the approach where prior and post beliefs about an individual
are to be similar [18, 27, 4]. As discussed in [13], this privacy
goal may be self-contradictory and impossible in the case of pri-
vacy preserving data publication. The goal of the published data is
for a receiver to know something about the population, it is by def-
inition that the receiver can discover something about an individual
in the population, and the receiver could happen to be the adver-
sary. Due to the seeming impossibility of the above goal, research
in differential privacy moves away from protecting the information
about a row in the data table that can be learned from other rows [5].
The argument is that such information is derivable without the par-
ticipation of the corresponding individual in the dataset, and hence
is not under the control of the individual. However, although not
under the individual’s control, such information could nevertheless
be sensitive.
An important goal of our work here is to show that it is possible
to protect sensitive information that can be acquired from the pub-
lished dataset provided that the data publisher, with control over
the dataset, can act on behalf of each individual. The principle of
protecting individual privacy may dictate that the publisher either
provides this kind of protection or does not publish the data. It
is desirable that on top of ensuring that the participation of a user
makes little difference to the results of data analysis, the publisher
also guarantees protection for sensitive information that can be de-
rived from the published dataset, with or without the data of the
individual involved. Such a solution is our goal. While Dalenius’s
original goal may be impossible, it is also an overkill. A “relaxed”
goal suffices: Anything “sensitive” that can be learned about a re-
spondent from the statistical database should be learnable without
access to the database. The obvious question is what should be
considered sensitive. We provide a plausible answer here.
Let us consider an example given in [14], where a datasetD′ tells
us that almost everyone involved in a dataset has one left foot and
one right foot. We would agree that knowing with high certainty
that a respondent is two footed from D′ is not considered a prob-
lem since almost everyone is two footed. Note that even if an indi-
vidual does not participate in the data collection, the deduction can
still be made based on a simple assumption of an i.i.d. data genera-
tion. Differential privacy and all of the proposed privacy models so
far do not exclude the possibilities of deriving information of such
form. In fact, by definition of data utility, such a derivation should
be supported. This example is not alarming since it involves a large
population. However there will be cases where the information be-
comes sensitive and requires protection. Let us consider a medical
data set. Suppose lung cancer is not a common disease. Also sup-
pose there are only five females aged 70, with postal code 2980
and all of them have lung cancer, the linkage of the corresponding
(gender, age, postal code) with lung cancer in this case is 100%; if
we maintain high utility for accurately extracting such information
or concepts, the privacy of the five females will be compromised.
The reason why this is alarming is because accurate answers to
queries of small counts can disclose highly sensitive information.
A problem with many existing techniques lie in non-discriminative
utilities for all concepts. We propose to consider discriminative
utilities which are based on the population sizes: queries involv-
ing large populations can be answered relatively accurately while
queries with a very small population base should not. A similar
idea is found in the literature of security for statistical databases [1,
30, 20, 21, 9] (see Section 10 on related work).
Protecting queries of small counts is implicit in many previous
works. For example, the principle of ℓ-diversity [25] essentially
protects against accurate answers to queries about the sensitive val-
ues of individuals, which may become small count queries given
that the adversary has knowledge about the non-sensitive values of
an individual and therefore is capable of linkage attack [29, 28].
We shall show that our mechanism provides better protection when
compared to ℓ-diversity approaches.
Our major contributions are summarized as follows. We point
out the dilemma that utility is a source of privacy breach, so that
on top of differential privacy we must also protect sensitive infor-
mation that can be derived from the published data. We propose
a mechanism for privacy preserving data publication which pro-
vides three lines of protection: (1) differential privacy to protect
information that may be attained from the data of an individual
tuple, (2) protection for concepts with small counts which can be
derived from the entire published data set, and (3) a guarantee that
the published data does not narrow down the set of possible sensi-
tive values for each individual. We enforce a stronger ǫ-differential
privacy guarantee by setting ǫ = 0. We support discriminative util-
ities so that concepts with large counts can be preserved. While ℓ-
diversity methods are vulnerable to adversary knowledge that elim-
inates ℓ− 1 possible values, our method is resilient to such attacks.
We have conducted experiments on a real dataset to show that our
method provides better utilities for the large sum queries than sev-
eral state of the art methods which do not have the above guarantee.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we re-
visit ǫ-differential privacy for non-interactive database sanitization.
We point out issues about ǫ and about known presence. Then we
introduce our model of ℓ′-diverted zero-differential privacy. Sec-
tion 3 describes a first attempt of a solution using an existing ran-
domization method, we show that this method cannot guarantee
zero-differential privacy. Section 4 describes our proposed mecha-
nism A′ which generates D′. Section 5 is about count estimation
given D′. Section 6 shows that mechanism A′ supports high utility
for large counts and high inaccuracies for small counts. Section 7
is about multiple attribute aggregations. Section 8 is a discussion
about auxiliary knowledge that may be possessed by the adversary.
Section 9 reports on the empirical study. Related works are sum-
marized in Section 10 and we conclude in Section 11.
2. ℓ’-DIVERTED PRIVACY
Our proposed method guarantees a desired form of differential
privacy with the additional protection against the disclosure of sen-
sitive information of small counts. In this section we shall introduce
our definition of privacy guarantee based on differential privacy.
First we examine some relevant definitions from previous works.
The following is taken from [6].
DEFINITION 1 (A(D) AND ǫ-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY).
For a database D, let A be a database sanitization mechanism,
we will say that A(D) induces a distribution over outputs.
We say that mechanism A satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if
for all neighboring databases D1 and D2 (i.e. D1 and D2
differ in at most one tuple), and for all sanitized outputs Dˆ,
Pr[A(D1) = Dˆ] ≤ e
ǫPr[A(D2) = Dˆ]
The above definition says that for any two neighboring
databases, the probabilities that A generates any particular dataset
for publication are very similar. However, there are some practical
problems with this definition.
2.1 The problem with ǫ
In ǫ-differential privacy, the parameter ǫ is public. The sanitized
data is released to the public, and the public refers to a wide spec-
trum of users and applications. It is not at all clear how we may
have the parameter ǫ decided once and for all. In [14], it is sug-
gested that we tend to think of ǫ as, say, 0.01, 0.1, or in some cases,
ln 2 or ln 3. Evidently the value can vary a lot. For example, for
the above suggested values, eǫ ranges from 1.01, 1.105 to 2 and 3.
A second problem with the setting of ǫ is that it may compro-
mise privacy. Suppose that for all pairs of neighboring datasets D1
and D2, where D2 contains t while D1 does not, Pr[A(D1) = Dˆ]
is 1/3, while Pr[A(D2) = Dˆ] is 1. If we set ǫ to ln 3, then ǫ-
differential privacy is satisfied, but the existence of t can be esti-
mated with 75% confidence.
The above concerns call for the elimination of ǫ. We can do
so by setting ǫ to zero. This is in fact the best guarantee since it
means that there is no difference between D1 and D2 in terms of
the probability of generating D′. We shall refer to this guarantee as
zero-differential privacy.
2.2 The issue of known presence
While the initial definition of differential privacy aims at hiding
the presence or absence of an individual’s data record, it is often
the case that the presence is already known. As discussed in [14],
in such cases, rather than hiding the presence, we wish to hide cer-
tain values in an individual’s row. We shall refer to such values that
need to be hidden as the sensitive values. The definition of differen-
tial privacy need to be adjusted accordingly. The phrase "differ in
at most one tuple" in Definition 1 can be converted to "have a sym-
metric difference of at most 2". This is so that in two datasets D1
and D2, if only the data for one individual is different, then we shall
find two tuples in the symmetric difference of D1 and D2. The two
tuples are tuples of the same individual in the two datasets, but the
sensitive values differ. However, with this definition, the counts for
sensitive values in D1 or D2 would deviate from the original data
set D. For a neighboring database, we prefer to preserve as much
as possible the characteristics in D. In the following subsection,
we introduce a definition of differential privacy that addresses the
above problems.
2.3 ℓ’-diverted zero-differential privacy
Given a dataset (table) D which is a set of N tuples, the problem
is how to generate sensitive values for the tuples in D to be pub-
lished in the output dataset D′. We assume that there are two kinds
of attributes in the dataset, the non-sensitive attributes (NSA) and a
sensitive attribute (SA) S. Let the domain of S be domain(S) =
{s1, ..., sm}. We do not perturb the non-sensitive values but we
may alter the sensitive values in the tuples to ensure privacy. We
first introduce our definition of neighboring databases which pre-
serves the counts of sensitive values, and we minimize the moves
by swapping the sensitive values of exactly one arbitrary pair of tu-
ples with different sensitive values. In the following we use t.s to
denote the value of the sensitive attribute of tuple t.
DEFINITION 2 (NEIGHBOR W.R.T. t). Suppose we have two
databases D1 and D2 containing tuples for the same set of individ-
uals, and D1 and D2 differ only at two pairs of tuples, t, t˘ in D1
and t′, t˘′ in D2. Tuples t and t′ are for the same individual, and t˘
and t˘′ are for another individual, with t.s 6= t˘.s, t.s = t˘′.s, and
t˘.s = t′.s. Then we say that D2 is a neighboring database to D1
with respect to t.
Our definition of neighbors bears some resemblance to the con-
cept of Bounded Neighbors in [23], where the counts of tuples are
preserved. As in [23], our objective is a good choice of neighbors
of D (the original dataset) which should be difficult to distinguish
from each other. Our differential privacy model retains the essence
in Definition 1 from [6].
DEFINITION 3 (ℓ′-DIVERTED PRIVACY). We say that a non-
interactive database sanitization mechanism A satisfies ℓ′-diverted
zero-differential privacy, or simply ℓ′-diverted privacy, if for any
given D1, for any tuple t in D1, there exists ℓ′ − 1 neighboring
databases D2 with respect to t, such that for all sanitized outputs
Dˆ, Pr[A(D1) = Dˆ] = Pr[A(D2) = Dˆ].
The above definition says that any individual may take on any of
ℓ′ different sensitive values by swapping the sensitive information
with other individuals in the dataset, and it makes no difference in
the probability of generating any dataset Dˆ. It seems that our def-
inition depends on the parameter ℓ′. However, not knowing which
ℓ′ − 1 neighboring databases it should be in the definition, an ad-
versary will not be able to narrow down the possibilities. There-
fore, even in the case where the adversary knows all the informa-
tion about all individuals except for 2 individuals, there is still no
certainty in the values for the 2 individuals.
Our task is to find a mechanism that satisfies ℓ′-diverted zero-
differential privacy while at the same time supports discriminative
utilities. The use of Laplace noise with distribution Lap(f/ǫ) is
common in ǫ-differential privacy [12]. However, this approach
will introduce arbitrary noise when ǫ becomes zero and it is de-
signed for interactive query answering. We need to derive a differ-
ent technique.
3. RANDOMIZATION: AN INITIAL AT-
TEMPT
In the search for a technique to guarantee a tapering accuracy for
the estimated values from large counts to small counts, the law of
large numbers [24] naturally comes to mind. Random perturbation
has been suggested in [30], the reason being that “If a query set
is sufficient large, the law of large numbers causes the error in the
query to be significantly less than the perturbations of individual
records.” Indeed, we have seen the use of i.i.d. for the randomiza-
tion of datasets with categorical attributes. In [4], an identity per-
turbation scheme for categorical sensitive values is proposed. This
scheme keeps the original sensitive value in a tuple with a probabil-
ity of p and randomly picks any other value to substitute for the true
value with a probability of (1− p), with equal probability for each
such value. Theorem 1 in [4] states that their method can achieve
good estimation for large dataset sizes. Therefore, it is fair to ask
if this approach can solve our problem at hand. Unfortunately, as
we shall show in the following, this method cannot guarantee zero-
differentiality unless p is equal to 1/M with a domain size of M ,
which renders the generated data a totally random dataset. Let us
examine this approach in more details.
Suppose that the tuple t of an individual has sensitive value t.s
in D. The set of sensitive values is given by {s1, ..., sm}. We
generate a sanitized value for the individual by selecting si with
probability pi, so that
pi =
{
p for si = t.s;
q for si 6= t.s
where
∑
i
pi = 1.
Let us refer to the anonymization mechanism above by A.
Let D′ be a dataset published by A which contains a tuple for
individual I . Consider two datasets D1, D2 which differ only in
the sensitive value for the single tuple for I .
We are interested in the probability Pr[A(D1) = D′] that D′ is
generated from D1 by A, and Pr[A(D2) = D′]. In particular, we
shall show that when p = q, A is zero-differential.
Let the tuples in D1 be t11, ..., t1N . Let the tuples in D2 be
t21, ..., t
2
N .
LEMMA 1. For mechanism A, if p = q, then A satisfies zero-
differential privacy according to Definition 1, with neighboring
databases having a symmetric difference of at most 2.
Proof: Since all the non-sensitive values are preserved and only
the sensitive values may be altered by A, we consider the proba-
bility that each tuple in D1 or D2 may generate the corresponding
sensitive value in D′. For Dk, k ∈ {1, 2}, let pk(ti, sj) be the
probability that A will generate sj for tuple ti.
Mechanism A handles each tuple independently. Hence
Pr[A(Dk) = D
′] is a function of pk(tki , sj) for all i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}.
Pr[A(Dk) = D
′] = f(pk(t
k
1 , s1), pk(t
k
1 , s2), ..., pk(t
k
1 , sm),
..., pk(t
k
N , s1), ..., pk(t
k
N , sm))
Given a tuple t with sensitive value t.s, the probability that a sen-
sitive value sj will be generated in D′ for t depends only on the
value of t.s.
Without loss of generality, let D1 and D2 differ only in the sen-
sitive value for tr. We have p1(t1i , sj) = p2(t2i , sj) for all j and all
i 6= r. Obviously if we set p = q = 1
m
, then the probability to gen-
erate any value given any original sensitive value will be the same.
Although t1r.s 6= t2r.s, we have p1(t1r, sj) = p2(t2r, sj) for all j.
Hence Pr[A(D1) = D′] = Pr[A(D2) = D′] and Mechanism A
satisfies zero-differential privacy.
LEMMA 2. For mechanism A, if p 6= q, then A does not satisfy
zero-differential privacy according to Definition 1, with neighbor-
ing databases having a symmetric difference of at most 2.
Proof: We prove by constructing a scenario where we are given
datasets D1, D2 differing in only one tuple, and a sanitized table
D′, and Pr[A(D1) = D′] 6= Pr[A(D2) = D′]. Consider the case
where all tuples are unique in terms of the non-sensitive attributes.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let p1(ti) = p if t1i .s = ti.s, and p1(ti) = q if
t1i .s 6= ti.s. We have Pr[A(D1) = D′] =
∏
i
p1(ti). Similarly
we define p2(ti) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Pr[A(D2) = D′] =
∏
i
p2(ti).
Furthermore, let t1k.s = tk.s and t2k.s 6= tk.s. Therefore, for tk,
p1(tk) = p and p2(tk) = q, while p1(ti) = p2(ti) for i 6= k.
Pr[A(D1) = D
′]
Pr[A(D2) = D′]
=
p
q
Since p 6= q, it follows that Pr[A(D1) = D′] 6= Pr[A(D2) =
D′] and therefore A does not satisfy zero-differential privacy.
LEMMA 3. For mechanism A, if p 6= q, then A is not ℓ’-
diverted zero-differential according to Definition 3.
Proof: We proof by showing a scenario where given D1, and
a neighboring database D2 with respect to a tuple t, and an
anonymized table D′, Pr[A(D1) = D′] 6= Pr[A(D2) = D′].
Let D1 and D2 agree on all tuples except for t1a and t1b in D1 and
corresponding tuples t2a and t2b in D2. Let all tuples be unique in
terms of the non-sensitive attributes.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let p1(ti) = p if t1i .s = ti.s, and p1(ti) = q if
t1i .s 6= ti.s. We have Pr[(A(D1) = D′] =
∏
i p1(ti). Similarly
we define p2(ti) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Pr[A(D2) = D′] =
∏
i
p2(ti).
Furthermore, let t1a.s = ta.s and t1b .s = tb.s, also t1a.s 6= ta.s
and t2b .s 6= tb.s. Therefore , for tk, p1(ta) = p, p1(ta) = p and
p2(ta) = q, p2(tb) = q, while p1(ti) = p2(ti) for i 6∈ {a, b}.
Pr[A(D1) = D
′]
Pr[A(D2) = D′]
=
p2
q2
Since p 6= q, it follows that Pr[A(D1) = D′] 6= Pr[A(D2) =
D′] and therefore A is not zero differential.
From the previous analysis, in order to make the probability
Pr[A(D1) = D
′] equal to Pr[A(D2) = D′], all values need
to be selected with probability equal to 1
m
. This would be the same
as random data and it would have great cost in the utility.
4. PROPOSED MECHANISM
From the previous section on mechanism A, we see that for
generating a dataset D′ from a given dataset D, randomization
with uniform probability can attain zero-differentiality. However,
if the probability is uniform over the entire domain, the utility
will be very low. Here we introduce a simple mechanism called
A′ which introduces uniform probability over a subset of the do-
main. We shall show that this mechanism satisfies ℓ′-diverted zero-
differential privacy without sacrificing too much utility. We make
the same assumption as in previous works [25, 34] that the dataset
is eligible, so that the highest frequency of any sensitive attribute
value does not exceed N/ℓ′. Furthermore we assume that N is a
multiple of ℓ′ (it is easy to ensure this by deleting no more than
ℓ′ − 1 tuples from the dataset).
4.1 Mechanism A′
Mechanism A′ generates a dataset D′ given the dataset D. We
assume that there is a single sensitive attribute (SA) S in D. We
shall show that A′ satisfies ℓ′-diverted zero-differential privacy.
There are four main steps for A′:
1. First we assume that the tuples in D have been randomly as-
signed unique tuple id’s independent of their tuple contents.
Include the tuple id as an attribute id in D. The first step
of A′ is an initialization step, whereby the dataset D goes
through a projection operation on id and the SA attribute
S. Let the resulting table be Ds. That is, Ds = Πid,S(D).
Note that the non-sensitive values have no influence on the
generation of Ds.
2. The set of tuples in Ds is partitioned into sets of size ℓ′ each
in such a way that in each partition, the sensitive value of
each tuple is unique. In other words, let there be r partitions,
P1, ..., Pr; in each partition Pi, there are ℓ′ tuples, and ℓ′ dif-
ferent sensitive values. We call each partition a decoy group.
If tuple t is in Pj , we say that the elements in Pj are the de-
coys for t. We also refer to Pj as P (t). With a little abuse of
terminology, we also refer to the set of records in D with the
same id’s as the tuples in this decoy group as P (t).
One can adopt some existing partitioning methods in the lit-
erature of ℓ-diversity. We require that the method be deter-
ministic. That is, given a Ds, there is a unique partitioning
from this step.
3. For each given tuple t in Ds, we determine the partition
P (t). Let the sensitive values in P (t) be {s′1, ..., s′ℓ′}. For
each of these decoy values, there is a certain probability that
the value is selected for publication as the sensitive value for
t. For a value not in {s′1, ..., s′ℓ′}, the probability of being
published as the value for t is zero. In the following we shall
also refer to the set {s′1, ..., s′ℓ′} as decoys(t).
Suppose that a tuple t has sensitive value t.s in D. Create
tuple t′ and initialize it to t. Next we generate a value to
replace the S value in t′ by selecting si with probability pi,
so that
pi = p for si = t.s
pi = q = (1− p)
1
ℓ′−1 for si 6= t.s, si ∈ decoys(t)
pi = 0 for si 6∈ decoys(t)
4. The set of tuples t′ created in the previous step forms a table
Ds′. Remove the s column from D, resulting in DN . Form
a new table D′ by joining Ds′ and DN and retaining only
NSA and S in the join result. The tuples in D′ are shuffled
randomly. Finally D′ and ℓ′ are published.
Algorithm 1 - Mechanism A′
Require: D with N tuples,with random tuple id’s, sensitive at-
tribute S, and set of non-sensitive attributes NSA
1: table Ds← Πid,S(D)
2: partition Ds into decoy groups of size ℓ′ each
so that each decoy group has ℓ′ unique sensitive values.
3: for each partition P do
4: for each tuple t in P do
5: let decoys(t) = {s′1, ..., s′ℓ′}
6: create tuple t′ and set t′.id = t.id
7: if t.s = s′i then
8: set t′.s = s′i with probability p
set t′.s to s′j 6= s
′
i with probability q
9: let Ds′ be the set of tuples t′ created in the above
10: D′ ← ΠNSA,S((Πid,NSAD) ✶id Ds′)
11: shuffle tuples in D′ and publish D′ and ℓ′
12: {Note that no other information about the partitions is pub-
lished }
The pseudocode for mechanism A′ is given in Algorithm 1.
At first glance, mechanism A′ looks similar to partitioning based
methods for ℓ-diversity [25], in fact, for the second step in A′, we
can adopt an existing partitioning algorithm such as the one in [34]
which has been designed for bucketization. However, A′ differs
from these previous approaches in important ways.
Firstly, the generation of dataset D′ is based on a probabilistic
assignment of values to attributes in the tuples. There is a non-zero
probability that an SA (sensitive attribute) value that exists in D
does not exist in D′. In known partitioning based methods, the SA
values in D′ are honest recording of the values in D, although in
some algorithms they may be placed in buckets separated from the
remaining values.
Secondly, the partitioning information is not released by A′, in
contrast to previous approaches, in which the anonymized groups
or buckets are made known in the data publication. For ℓ-diversity
methods, since the partitioning is known, each tuple has a limited
set of ℓ possible values. By withholding the partitioning informa-
tion, plus the possibility that a value existing in D may not exist in
D′, there is essentially no limit to the possible values for S except
for the entire domain for any tuple in D′.
4.2 ℓ′-diverted zero-differentiality guaruantee
For the privacy guarantee, we shall show that if p = q, then A′
satisfies ℓ’-diverted zero-differential privacy, otherwise, it does not.
First we need to state a fact about A′.
FACT 1. In mechanism A′, let p = q = 1−p
ℓ′−1 , so that p = q =
1
ℓ′
. When executing A′, for two tuples t and t′ in the same partition
(P (t) = P (t′)), and any sensitive value si, the probability that t
will be assigned si by A′ is equal to that for t′.
The following theorem says that we should set p = q = 1/ℓ′ in
mechanism A′.
THEOREM 1. For mechanism A′, if p = q = 1
ℓ′
, then A′ satis-
fies ℓ′-diverted zero-differential privacy.
Proof: Let D′ be a published dataset. Given a dataset D1 which
may generate D′, and a tuple t in D1, we find ℓ′ − 1 neighboring
databases D2 as follows:
We execute A′ on top of D1. In the first step, D1s is generated
from D1. In the second step, D1s is partitioned into sets of size ℓ′.
Let P (t) be the partition (decoy group) formed by A′ for t in D1.
Pick one element t˘ in P (t) where t˘ 6= t. Form D2 by swapping
the non-sensitive values of t and t˘ in D1. By definition D2 is a
neighboring database of D1.
LetD2s be the table generated from Step 1 ofA′ on D2. Since we
have only swapped the non-sensitive values of t and t˘, D1s = D2s .
The partitioning step of A′ is deterministic, meaning that the same
partitioning will be obtained for D1 and D2. From the above, we
know that t and t˘ are in the same partition for D1, i.e., P (t) =
P (t˘). When we consider the generation of sensitive values for t and
t˘, since they are in the same partition P (t), by Fact 1, they have the
same probabilities for different outcomes. Since the SA values for
different tuples are generated independently, Pr[A′(D1) = D′] =
Pr[A′(D2) = D′].
There are ℓ′ − 1 possible D2 given D1, we have shown that A′
satisfies ℓ′-diverted zero-differential privacy.
THEOREM 2. For mechanism A′, if p 6= q, then A′ does not
satisfy ℓ′-diverted zero-differential privacy.
Proof: We prove by giving an instance where A′ is not ℓ′-
diverted zero-differential. We say that a dataset D is A′-consistent
with D′ if there is a non-zero probability that D′ is generated from
D by A′. Consider D1 and D2, each being consistent with D′. Let
the tuples in D1 be t11, ..., t1N . Let the tuples in D2 be t21, ..., t2N .
The two sets of tuples are for the same set of individuals. Further-
more, assume that D1 and D2 differ in only 2 tuples for a pair of
individuals; let the pair of tuples in D1 be t1a, t1b , and that in D2
be t2a, t2b . Assume that all tuples have unique non-sensitive values,
and
t1a.s = t
′
a.s, t
1
b .s = t
′
b.s
t2a.s 6= t
′
a.s, t
2
b .s 6= t
′
b.s
t1a.s = t
2
b .s, t
2
a.s = t
1
b , s
For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , let p1(ti) = p if t1i .s = t′i.s, and p1(ti) = q if
t1i .s 6= t
′
i.s. Similarly we define p2(ti) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Therefore , for ta, p1(ta) = p1(tb) = p and p2(ta) = p2(tb) =
q, while p1(ti) = p2(ti) for i 6∈ {a, b}.
Pr[A′(D1) = D′]
Pr[A′(D2) = D′]
=
∏
i
p1(ti)∏
i
p2(ti)
=
p2
q2
Since p 6= q, it follows that Pr[A′(D1) = D′] 6= Pr[A′(D2) =
D′] and therefore A is not zero differential.
The above theorems show that in order to enforce ℓ′-diverted
zero-differential privacy, we should set both p and q to 1/ℓ′. This
will be the assumption in our remaining discussions about A′.
5. AGGREGATE ESTIMATION
In this section we examine how to answer counting queries for
the sensitive attribute based on the published dataset D′.
Let |D| = N , so that there are N tuples in D. Consider a sensi-
tive value s. Let the true frequency of s in D be fs. By mechanism
A′, there will be fs decoy groups which contain s in the decoy
value sets. Each tuple in these groups has a probability of p = 1
ℓ′
to be assigned s in D′. The probability that it is assigned other
values s¯ is 1− p. There are fsℓ′ such tuples.
LetN ′s denote the number of times that s is published in D′. The
random variable N ′s has the binomial distribution with parameters
fsℓ
′ and p.
P
[
N ′s = x
]
=
(
fsℓ
′
x
)
px(1− p)fsℓ
′−x
The expected value is fsℓ′p, and σ2 = fsℓ′p(1− p)
Since we set p = q = 1/ℓ′, the expected count of s in D′ is
given by es = p ℓ′fs = fs, we have
es = fs
That is, to estimate the true count of an SA value s, we simply take
the count of s in D′, f ′s.
THEOREM 3. The estimation of fs by f ′s is a maximum likeli-
hood estimation (MLE).
Proof. Let L(D) be the likelihood of the observation f ′s in D′,
given the original dataset D. L(D) = Pr(f ′s|D)
From Mechanism A’, given fs occurrences of s in D, there will
be exactly ℓ′fs tuples that generates s in D′ with a probability of p.
The remaining tuples have zero probability of generating a s value.
The probability that f ′s occurrences of s is generated in D′ is given
by
L(D) = Pr(f ′s|D) =
(
ℓ′fs
f ′s
)
pf
′
s(1− p)ℓ
′fs−f ′s
where p = 1/ℓ′.
This is a binomial distribution function which is maximized
when f ′s is at the mean value of ℓ′fsp = fs.
To examine the utility of the dataset D′, we ask how likely f ′s is
close to fs, and hence the estimation es is close to the true count
fs? However, we also need to provide protection for small counts.
In the next section we shall analysis these properties of the pub-
lished dataset.
6. PRIVACY, UTILITY, AND THE SUM
As discussed in Section 1, the utility of the dataset must be
bounded so that for certain facts, in particular, those that involve
very few individuals, the published data should provide sufficient
protection. Here we consider the relationship between the utility
and the number of tuples n that is related to a sensitive value. Is
it possible to balance between disclosing useful information where
n is large and hence safe and not disclosing accurate information
when n is small and hence need protection? We explore these is-
sues in the following.
6.1 Utility for large sums
To answer the question about the utility for large sums, we make
use of the Chebychev’s inequality which gives a bound for the like-
lihood that an observed value deviates from its mean.
Chebychev’s Theorem: If X is a random variable with mean µ
and standard deviation σ, then for any positive k, Pr(|X − µ| <
kσ) ≥ 1− 1
k2
and Pr(|X − µ| ≥ kσ) ≤ 1
k2
Let X1, X2, ..., Xn, ... be a sequence of independent, identically
distributed random variables, each with mean µ and variance σ2.
Define the new sequence of Xi values by
Xn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi, n = 1, 2, 3, ...
From Chebychev’s inequality, P
[
|Xn − µXn | ≥ kσXn
]
≤ 1
k2
where µXn = E[Xn] = µ, σXn = E[(Xn − µ)
2] = σ
2
n
and k is
any positive real number. Choose k = ǫ
√
n
σ
for some ǫ > 0, we get
Pr
[
|Xn − µ| ≥ ǫ
]
≤
σ2
ǫ2n
(1)
The above reasoning has been used to prove the law of large
numbers. Let us see how it can help us to derive the utility of
our published data for large sums. If there are fs tuples with s
value, then n = ℓ′fs tuples in D will have a probability of p to
be assigned s in D′. The setting of value s to the tuples in D′
corresponds to a sequence of ℓ′fs independent Bernoulli random
variables, X1, .., , Xℓ′fs , each with parameter p. Here Xi = 1
corresponds to the event that s is chosen for the i-th tuple, while
Xi = 0 corresponds to the case where s is not chosen.
The mean value µXn = p. Also, σ
2
Xn
= p(1 − p)/n. From
Inequality (1),
Pr
[
|Xn − µ| ≥ ǫ
]
≤
p(1− p)
ǫ2n2
=
p(1− p)
ǫ2ℓ′2f2s
From Section 2.3, we set p = 1
ℓ′
, hence
Pr
[
|Xn − µ| ≥ ǫ
]
≤
1
ℓ′3ǫ2f2s
(2)
Note that Xn is the count of s in D′ divided by n, and n =
ℓ′fs. Hence the occurrence of s in D′ is f ′s = ℓ′fsXn. Rewriting
Inequality (2), we get
Pr
[
|ℓ′fsXn − ℓ
′fsµ| ≥ ℓ
′fsǫ
]
≤
1
ℓ′3ǫ2f2s
Since µ = p = 1/ℓ′, Pr [|f ′s − fs| ≥ ℓ′ǫfs] ≤ 1ℓ′3ǫ2f2
s
With the above inequality, we are interested in how different f ′s
is from fs. Since the deviation is bounded by ℓ′ǫfs, it is better to
use another variable ε = ℓ′ǫ to quantify the difference.
Pr
[
|f ′s − fs| ≥ εfs
]
≤
1
ℓ′ε2f2s
(3)
Our estimation is es = f ′s, hence the above gives a bound on the
probability of error in our estimation. If fs is small, then the bound
is large. In other words the utility is not guaranteed. This is our
desired effect.
Given a desired ε and a desired ℓ′, we may find a frequency
threshold T f so that for fs above this threshold, the probability
of error in Inequality (3) is below another threshold TE for utility.
We can set the RHS in the above inequality to be this threshold.
Obviously, 1
ℓ′ε2f2
s
≤ TE for fs ≥ Tf
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Figure 1: Relationship between TE and Tf
DEFINITION 4 (THRESHOLDS TE AND Tf ). Given an origi-
nal dataset D and an anonymized dataset D′. A value s has a (ǫ,
TE ,Tf ) utility guarantee if for a frequency fs of s above the fre-
quency threshold of Tf in D,
Pr
[
|f ′s − fs| ≥ εfs
]
≤ TE for fs ≥ Tf (4)
The above definition says that a value s has a (ǫ, TE ,Tf ) guar-
antee if whenever the frequency fs of s is above Tf in D, then the
probability of a relative error of more than ε is at most TE .
LEMMA 4. Mechanism A′ provides a (ǫ, TE ,Tf ) utility guar-
antee for each sensitive value, where
1
ℓ′ε2TE
= T 2f (5)
Hence given, ε and TE , we can determine the smallest count
which can provide the utility guarantee.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider some possible values for the parame-
ters. Suppose TE = 0.02 and ℓ′ = 10. If ε = 0.2, then Tf = 11.
If ǫ = 0.001, or ε = 0.02 then Tf = 49.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the possible values of
Tf and TE . The utility is better for small TE , and the value of TE
becomes very small when the count is increasing towards 900. Note
that utility is the other side of privacy breach, it also means that for
concepts with large counts, privacy protection is not guaranteed,
since the accuracy in the count will be high.
6.2 Privacy for small sums
Next we show how our mechanism can inherently provide pro-
tection for small counts. From Inequality (3), small values of fs
will weaken the guarantee of utility. We can in fact give a proba-
bility for relative errors based on the following analysis.
The number of s in D′ is the total number of successes in fsℓ′
repeated independent Bernoulli trials with probability 1
ℓ′
of success
on a given trial. It is the binomial random variable with parameters
n = ℓ′fs and p = 1ℓ′ . The probability that this number is x is given
by (
n
x
)
pxqn−x =
(
ℓ′fs
x
)(
1
ℓ′
)x (
1−
1
ℓ′
)ℓ′fs−x
EXAMPLE 2. If fs = 5, ℓ′ = 10, for an ε = 0.3 bound on the
relative error, we are interested to know how likely f ′s is close to 5
within a deviation of 1. The probability that f ′s is between 4 to 6 is
given by
6∑
x=4
(
n
x
)
pxqn−x =
6∑
x=4
(
50
x
)
0.1x0.950−x ≈ 0.52
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Figure 2: Expected error for small sums
Hence the probabilty that f ′s deviates from fs by more than 0.3fs
is about 0.52.
DEFINITION 5 (PRIVACY GUARANTEE). We say that a sensi-
tive value s has a (ε,TP ) privacy guarantee if the probability that
the estimated count of s, f ′s, has a relative error of more than ε is
at least TP .
In Example 2, the value s has a (0.3, 0.48) privacy guarantee. A
graph is plotted in Figure 2 for the expected error for small values
of fs. Here the summation in the above probability is taken from
f ′s = ⌈0.7fs⌉ to f
′
s = ⌊1.3fs⌋. We have plotted for different fs
values the probability given by
1−
⌊1.3fs⌋∑
x=⌈0.7fs⌉
(
n
x
)
pxqn−x
This graph shows that the relative error in the count estimation is
expected to be large for sensitive values with small counts.
7. MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTE PREDICATES
In this section we consider the counts for sets of values. For ex-
ample, we may want to know the count of tuples with both lung
cancer and smoking, or the count of tuples with gender = female,
age = 60 and disease = allergy. The problem here is counting the
occurrences of values of an attribute set. Firstly we shall consider
counts for predicates involving a single sensitive attribute, then we
extend our discussion to predicates involving multiple sensitive at-
tributes.
7.1 Predicates involving a single SA
Assume that we have a set of non-sensitive attributes NSA and
a single sensitive attribute SA, let us consider queries involving
both NSA and SA. We may divide such a query into two com-
ponents: P and s, where P ∈ domain(NA) (NA ⊆ NSA),
and s ∈ domain(SA). For example P = (female, 60) and
s = (allergy). Note that the non-sensitive attributes are not dis-
torted in the published dataset. This can be seen as a special case
of generating a non-sensitive value for the individual t by selecting
si with probability pi, so that
pi =
{
1 for si = t.s;
0 for si 6= t.s.
Suppose we are interested in the count of the co-occurrences of
non-sensitive values P and SA s.
DEFINITION 6 (STATE i). There are 4 conjunctive predicates
concerning P and s, namely, p0 = P ∧s, p1 = P ∧s, p2 = P ∧s,
and p3 = P ∧ s. If a tuple satisfies pi, we say that it is at state i.
The distributions of the predicates in D and D′ are given by
cnt(pi) and cnt′(pi), respectively. Here cnt(pi)(cnt′(pi)) is the
number of tuples satisfying pi in D (D′).
For simplicity we let xi = cnt(pi) and yi = cnt′(pi), hence
the a priori distribution concerning the states in D is given by
x = {x0, x1, x2, x3}, and the distribution in D′ is given by
y = {y0, y1, y2, y3}. Hence y contains the observed frequencies.
DEFINITION 7 (TRANSITION MATRIX M ). The probability
of transition for a tuple from an initial state i in D to a state j
in D′ is given by aij . The values aji forms a transition matrix M .
The values of aij are given in Figure 3.
y0(Ps) y1(Ps) y2(Ps) y3(Ps)
a00 = a01 = a02 = 0 a03 = 0
x0(Ps) 1− a01 x1+x3N
a10 = a11 = a12 = 0 a13 = 0
x1(Ps) ℓ
′−1
ℓ′
1
ℓ′
a20 = 0 a21 = 0 a22 = a23 =
x2(Ps) 1− a23 x1+x3N
a30 = 0 a31 = 0 a32 = a33 =
x3(Ps) ℓ
′−1
ℓ′
1
ℓ′
Figure 3: State transition probabilities
Let Pr(ri|x) be the probability that a tuple has state i in D′
given vector x for the initial state distribution. The following can
be derived.
Pr(r0|x) =
1
N
((
1−
x1 + x3
N
)
x0 +
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
x1
)
(6)
Pr(r1|x) =
1
N
((x1 + x3
N
)
x0 +
1
ℓ′
x1
)
(7)
Pr(r2|x) =
1
N
((
1−
x1 + x3
N
)
x2 +
ℓ′ − 1
ℓ′
x3
)
(8)
Pr(r3|x) =
1
N
((x1 + x3
N
)
x2 +
1
ℓ′
x3
)
(9)
The above equations are based on the mechanism generating D′
from D. Let us consider the last equation, the other equations are
derived in a similar manner. For each true occurrence of (P, s),
there is a 1
ℓ′
probability that it will generate such an occurrence
in D′. If there are x3 such tuples, then the expected number of
generated instances will be x3/ℓ′.
Other occurrences of (P, s) in D′ may be generated by the x2
tuples satisfying P but with t.s 6= s (P, s). Each such tuple t
satisfies P for the non sensitive values and it is possible that s ∈
decoys(t). We are interested to know how likely s ∈ decoys(t).
There are in total N
ℓ′
partitions. There can be at most one s tuple
in each partition. Hence fs of the partitions contain s in the decoy
set, and if a tuple t is in such a partition, then s ∈ decoys(t). The
probability of having s in decoys(t) for a tuple twith t.s 6= s is the
probability that t is in one of the fs partitions above. Since mech-
anism A′ does not consider the NSA values in the randomization
process, all such tuples t have equal probability of being in any of
the fs partitions, and the probability is given by fs/Nℓ′ = fs
ℓ′
N
.
Since fs = x1 + x3, this probability is x1+x3N ℓ
′
.
The total expected occurrence of (P, s) is given by
x3
ℓ′
+
(x1 + x3
N
ℓ′
) x2
ℓ′
We can convert this into a conditional probability that a tuple
in D′ satisfies (P, s) given x, denoted by Pr(r3|x). This gives
Equation (9).
Rewriting Equations (6) to (9) with the transition probabilities in
Figure 3 gives the following:
Pr(ri|x) =
3∑
j=0
aji
xj
N
(10)
Equation (10) shows that aji is the probability of transition for a
tuple from an initial state j in D to a state i in D′.
We adopt the iterative Bayesian technique for the estimation of
the counts of x0, ..., x3. This method is similar to the technique in
[4] for reconstructing multiple column aggregates.
Let the original states of tuples t1, ..., tN in D be U1, ..., UN ,
respectively. Let the states of the corresponding tuples in D′ be
V1, ..., VN . From Bayes rule, we have
Pr(Uk = i|Vk = j) =
P (Vk = j|Uk = i)P (Uk = i)
P (Vk = j)
Since Pr(Uk = i) = xi/N , and Pr(Vk = j|Uk = i) = aij ,
Pr(Uk = i|Vk = j) =
aij
xi
N∑
3
r=0
arj
xr
N
(11)
Pr(Uk = i) =
3∑
j=0
Pr(Vk = j)Pr(Uk = i|Vk = j)
Hence, since Pr(Vk = j) = yj/N , Pr(Uk = j) = xj/N and
from Equation (11), we have
xi
N
=
3∑
j=0
yj
N
aij
xi
N∑
3
r=0
arj
xr
N
We iteratively update x by the following equation
xt+1i =
3∑
j=0
yj
atijx
t
i∑3
r=0
atrjx
t
r
(12)
We initialize x0 = y, and xt is the value of x at iteration t. In
Equation (12), atij refer to the value of aij at iteration t, meaning
that the value of atij depends on setting the values of x = xt. We
iterate until xt+1 does not differ much from xt. The value of x at
this fixed point is taken as the estimated x values. In particular x3
is the estimated count of (P, s).
For the multiple attribute predicate counts, we also guarantee that
privacy for small sums will not be jeopardized.
LEMMA 5. Let s be a sensitive value with a (ε, Tp) privacy
guarantee, then the count for a multiple column aggregate involv-
ing s also has the same privacy guarantee.
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider a multiple attribute
aggregate of (P, s), where P ∈ domain(NSA). Since the ran-
domization of s is independent of the NSA attributes, the expected
relative error introduced for (P , s) is the same as that for (P, s).
The total expected error for (P , s) and (P, s) must not be less than
that dictated by the (ε, TP ) guarantee since otherwise the sum of
the two counts will generate a better estimate for the count of s,
violating the (ε, TP ) privacy for s. Hence for (P, s) the privacy
guarantee is at least (ε, TP ).
7.2 Multiple sensitive attributes
So far we have considered that there is a single sensitive at-
tribute in the given dataset. Suppose instead of a single sensitive
attribute (SA), there are multiple SAs, let the sensitive attributes
be S1, S2, ...Sw . We can generalize the randomization process by
treating each SA independently, building decoy sets for each Si.
For predicates involving {P, s1, s2, ..., sw}, where P is a set of
values for a set of non-sensitive attributes, si ∈ domain(Si), there
will be K = 2w+1 different possible states for each tuple. We let
(P, s1, s2, ..., sw) stand for (P∧s1∧s2...∧sw). For reconstruction
of the count for (P, s1, s2, ..., sw), we form a transition matrix for
all the K = 2w+1 possible states. It is easy to see that the case
of a single SA in Section 7.1 is a special case where the transition
matrix M is the tensor product of two matrices M0 and M1, A =
M0
⊗
M1, where M0 is for the set of non-sensitive values and M1
is for s1, and they are defined as follows:
M0 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
Mi =
(
1−
fsi
N
fsi
N
ℓ′−1
ℓ′
1
ℓ′
)
In general, with sensitive attributes S1, ..., Sw, the transition ma-
trix is given by M = M0
⊗
M1...
⊗
Mw.
Let the entries in matrix M be given by mij . We initialize x0 =
y and iteratively update x by the following equation
xt+1i =
K−1∑
j=0
yj
mtijx
t
i∑K−1
r=0
mtrjx
t
r
(13)
In Equation (13), xt is the value of x at iteration t. atij refer
to the value of mij at iteration t, meaning that the value of mtij
depends on setting the values of x = xt. We iterate until xt+1 does
not differ much from xt. The value of x at this fixed point is taken
as the estimated x values. In particular xK−1 is the estimated count
of (P, s1, ..., sw).
8. BELIEF ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL
An adversary may be armed with auxiliary knowledge in the at-
tack on the sensitive value of an individual. In general auxiliary
knowledge allows an adversary to rule out possibilities and sharpen
their belief about the sensitive value of an individual. For example,
a linkage attack refers to an attack with the help of knowledge about
another database which is linked to the published data. The other
database could be a voter registration list, and it has been discov-
ered that only the values of birthdate, sex and zip code are often
sufficient to identify an individual [29, 28].
In the design of ℓ-diversity [25], the set of tuples are divided into
blocks and there should be ℓ well represented sensitive values in
each block. The adversary needs ℓ−1 damaging pieces of auxiliary
knowledge to eliminate ℓ− 1 possible sensitive values and uncover
the private information of an individual. Our method is an improve-
ment over the ℓ-diversity model since the possible sensitive values
in our case is the entire domain of the sensitive attribute, including
values that do not appear in the dataset. Hence if the domain size is
m, the adversary would need m− 1 pieces of auxiliary knowledge
to rule out m − 1 possible values, but in that case, the adversary
knows a priori the exact value without examining D′.
Another form of auxiliary knowledge is knowledge about the
sanitization mechanism. Since many known approaches aim to
minimize the distortion to the data, they suffer from minimality
attack [31]. Our method does not involve any distortion minimiza-
tion step and therefore minimality attack will not be applicable.
9. EMPIRICAL STUDY
We have implemented our mechanism A′ and compared with
some existing techniques that are related in some way to our
method.
For step 2 of mechanism A′, we need to partition tuples in Ds
into sets of size ℓ′ each and each partition contains ℓ′ different sen-
sitive values. We have adopted the group creation step in the algo-
rithm for Anatomy [34]. In this algorithm, all tuples of the given
table are hashed into buckets by the sensitive values, so that each
bucket contains tuples with the same SA value. The group creation
step consists of multiple iterations. In each iteration a partition
(group) with ℓ′ tuples is created. Each iteration has two sub-steps:
(1) find the set L with the ℓ′ hash buckets that currently have the
largest number of tuples. (2) From each bucket in L, randomly
select a tuple to be included in the newly formed partition. Note
that the random selection in step (2) can be made deterministic by
picking the tuple with the smallest tuple id.
9.1 Experimental setup
The experiments evaluate both effectiveness and efficiency of
mechanism A′ for ℓ′-diverted privacy. We also compare our
method with three other approaches, Anatomy for ℓ-diversity, dif-
ferential privacy by means of Laplacian perturbation, and global
randomization (mechanism A). Our code is written in C++ and ex-
ecuted on a PC with CORE(TM) i3 3.10 GHz CPU and 4.0 GB
RAM. The dataset is generated by randomly sampling 500k tu-
ples from the CENSUS1 dataset which contains the information for
American adults. We further produce five datasets from the 500k
dataset, with cardinalities ranging from 100k to 500k. The default
cardinality is 100k. Occupation is chosen as the sensitive attribute,
which involves 50 distinct values.
In the experiment we consider count queries, which have
been used for utility studies for partition-based methods [34] and
randomization-based methods [27]. A pool of 5000 count queries
is generated according to the method described in Appendix 10.9
in [7]. Specifically, we generate random predicates on the non-
sensitive attributes, each of which is combined with each of the
values in the domain of the sensitive attribute to form a query.
We count the tuples satisfying a condition of the form A1 =
v1 ∧ ... ∧ Ad = vd ∧ SA = vs, where each Ai is a distinct non-
sensitive attribute, SA is the sensitive attribute, and the vi and vs
are values from the domains of Ai and SA, respectively. The se-
lectivity of a query is defined as the percentage of tuples that satisfy
the conditions in the query. For each selectivity s that is considered
we report on the average relative error of the estimated count for
all queries that pass the selectivity threshold s. In later analysis, we
group queries according to their distinct selectivities.
Given queries in the pool, we calculate the average relative error
between the actual count (from the original dataset) and estimated
count (from the published dataset) as the metric for utility. As
discussed earlier, we differentiate between small counts and large
counts. Specifically, we vary the selectivity (denoted by s, which is
the ratio of the actual count to the cardinality of dataset) from 0.5%
up to 5% for large counts. For small counts, we require the actual
count to be no more than 10 (selectivity less than 0.1%). We eval-
uate the influence of various ℓ’ values, and also the cardinalities of
dataset on the utility. To assess the efficiency, we record and show
the running time of our data publishing algorithm.
9.2 Utility for large counts
First we shall examine the impact of varying ℓ’, while we have
1Downloadable at http://www.ipums.org
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Figure 5: Relative error for small counts
separate plot for distinct selectivity. In particular, the average rel-
ative error is computed for ℓ’ ranging from 2 to 10, as shown in
Figure 4 where selectivity of large counts is concerned. For large
selectivity (i.e., large counts) between 2% and 5%, the error is as
low as 20%. The error is also bounded by 40% for other selectiv-
ities, which is acceptable. Another observation is a trend that, as
ℓ’ increases, the error for most selectivities first decreases but soon
start to rise. This can be explained by the fact that more restricted
privacy (larger ℓ’) requirement may compromise the utility. For the
special case where the query involves only the sensitive attribute,
the relative errors of both small and large counts are shown in Fig-
ure 6. The results agree with our analysis in Section 6. The relative
error is as well shown against the selectivity in figure 7 .
9.3 Error for small counts
We plot the error of queries with small counts separately in Fig-
ure 5, where the counts are smaller than 10. As one can observe, the
error is sufficiently high to ensure privacy, consistent with our re-
quirement that answer for small count should be inaccurate enough
to prevent privacy leakage. The relative error also displays a posi-
tive linear correlation with ℓ′. In other words, as ℓ′ becomes bigger
(higher privacy), privacy for small counts is also ensured at a higher
level.
9.4 Comparison with other models
To our knowledge there is no known mechanism for ℓ′-diverted
privacy. We would like to compare the utilities of our method with
other models although it is not a fair comparison since our method
provides guarantees not supported by the other models. We have
chosen to compare with Anatomy because we have used a similar
partitioning mechanism, and Anatomy is an improvement over pre-
vious ℓ-diversity methods since it does not distort the non-sensitive
values. We compare with the distortion based differential privacy
method since it has been the most vastly used technique in differ-
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Figure 7: Relative error versus selectivity for SA querying
ential privacy. Finally we shall compare with the global random-
ization mechanism A described in Section 3. We shall see that our
method compares favorably with the other methods in terms of util-
ity while addressing the dilemma of utility versus privacy.
To compare with the Anatomy method, we set both ℓ′ in ℓ′-
diverted and ℓ in Anatomy to the same value, ℓ′ = ℓ = 5. The
answers for Anatomy are estimated using the method in [34]. We
then choose different s and N (sizes of dataset) to evaluate their
performance. The average relative errors for Anatomy and mech-
anism A′ are shown in Figures 8 and 9, respectively. The overall
error of our method appears smaller than that of Anatomy for most
choices of N and s. The error is bounded by 30% for mechanism
A′ and can be over 40% for Anatomy. We can also get an idea of
the influence of different cardinalities of dataset on the error. In
fact, the error does not show an obvious correlation with N .
Typical differential privacy secures privacy by adding noises to
the answers. Given a set of queries q1, ..., qm, ǫ-differential privacy
can be achieved by a randomization function with a noise distribu-
tion of Lap(
∑m
i=1
∆fi/ǫ) [13]. Since m is the maximum number
of queries that can be submitted to D′, we first set m to be 100,
and we choose the ǫ parameter in the Laplacian noise to be 0.01
and 0.05, which are normal choices found in the literature. The
100k dataset is used, and the average relative error is shown for s
between 1% and 5% in Figure 10. The error from differential pri-
vacy, no matter which ǫ is chosen, will become unacceptably large
for smaller s. On the other hand, the impact of s is limited in the
case of our method, the result of which is labeled “ℓ′-diverted” in
the graph. To see how m, the number of queries raised, affects the
utility, we plot the relative error against m valued from 10 to 100 in
Figure 11. Obviously the relative error from our method does not
depend on m, while that from differential privacy grows linearly
with m, and become very large for large m.
The results for the global randomization Mechanism A is shown
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in Figure 10. We set the value of p to 1/ℓ′ so that the probability to
retain the original sensitive value in each tuple is the same in both
methods. It can be seen that our method has much better utility for
all the selectivities in our experiment.
9.5 Multiple sensitive values
We also consider the utility in scenarios where a query involves
more than one sensitive value. To this end, we choose Age and
Occupation as the sensitive attributes. The two sensitive attributes
are randomized independently and then combined for data publica-
tion. To allow queries of large selectivities, we first generalize the
domain of Age into ten intervals; without this step, most of the re-
sulting counts are too small and the range of selectivities is limited.
The relative error for multiple-dimension aggregates involving two
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Figure 10: Comparison of our method (ℓ′-diverted) with differ-
ential privacy and global randomization by mechanism A
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sensitive attributes is shown in Figure 12, where ℓ′ ranges from 2 to
8. Although given the diminished selectivities (0.1% to 0.7% for
this case), the overall accuracy can match that in single-sensitive-
attribute scenario.
9.6 Computational overhead
The computational overhead mainly comes from the partitioning
process. We have adopted the partitioning method of Anatomy.
This algorithm can be implemented with a time complexity of
O(N(1+ V
ℓ′
)), where N is the cardinality of the table, and V is the
number of distinct values of the sensitive attribute. We show the
running time for the case of single sensitive attribute on the largest
500K dataset, varying ℓ′ from 2 to 10. For all chosen ℓ′ values, our
algorithm can finish within 10 seconds for a 500K dataset, which
is practical to be deployed in real applications.
We also consider the querying efficiency at the user side. To esti-
mate the answer, a user will compute each component of the vector
y, and do matrix multiplications to iteratively converge at the an-
swer x. When each component of y changes by no more than 1%,
we terminate the iteration and measure the querying time and num-
ber of iterations. In our experiments, SQLITE32 serves for query-
ing y, and we consider the case with two sensitive attributes which
involves the most number of components in y, implying the largest
computational cost. The result shows that the Bayesian iterative
process takes negligible time, while the major cost comes from the
querying step. In particular, it takes less than 1 ms in average, and
10 ms in the worst case, for the iterative process to converge. The
median and average of the number of iterations is 16 and 325, re-
spectively. In total, the average measured time for a query is 1612
ms, which poses little computational burden on users.
2See http://docs.python.org/library/sqlite3.html
10. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy has been a break-through in the study of
privacy preserving information releases. ǫ-differential privacy has
been introduced for query answering and the common technique
is based on distortion to the query answer by a random noise that
is i.i.d. from a Laplace distribution and calibrated to the sensitiv-
ity of the querying [15, 12]. Laplace noise has been used in many
related works on differential privacy including recent works on re-
ducing relative error [33] and the publication of data cubes in [10].
Since the data release can be for different purposes, in some tasks,
the addition of noise makes no sense. For example, a utilization
function might map databases to strings, strategies, or trees. The
problem of optimizing the output of such a function while preserv-
ing ǫ-differential privacy is addressed in [26]. For database pub-
lication, [6] shows that given a large enough dataset, a synthetic
database can be generated that is approximately correct for all con-
cepts in a given concept class; the minimal data size depends on the
quality of the approximation, the log of the size of the universe, the
privacy parameter ǫ and the Vapnick-Chervonenkis dimension of
the concept class. Further results can be found in [17]. In most pre-
vious works, the definition of error is an absolute error [11, 16, 6,
17]. The algorithm iReduct in [33] considers relative errors and in-
jects noise to query results according to the values of the results. A
recent work [23] points out that differential privacy may not guar-
antee privacy when deterministic statistics have been previously
published. In contrast we consider a more basic possible privacy
leak which is due to the fact that differential privacy does not aim
to protect information that can be derived from the published data,
deeming such a task impossible. All previous works on differential
privacy consider ǫ-differential privacy for non-zero ǫ values. None
of the works in the above considers the guarantee of protection of
small sums, which is a major objective in our mechanism.
In the literature of statistical databases, the protection of small
counts has been well-studied in the topic of security in statistical
databases [1]. A concept similar to ours is found in [30] where the
aim is to ensure that the error in queries involving a large number
of tuples will be significantly less than the perturbation of individ-
ual tuples. It has been pointed out in previous works [20, 21] that
the security of a database is endangered by allowing answers to
counting queries that involve small counts, i.e. the number of tu-
ples involved in the query is small. In [9], random sampling has
been used to ensure large errors for small query set sizes. However,
these previous works are about the secure disclosure of statistics
from a dataset and do not deal with the problem of sanitization of
a dataset for publication, and they have not considered the guar-
antee of differential privacy. Discriminative privacy protection has
been considered in some previous work in privacy preserving data
publication such as [35, 37], however, such works are based on
personalized privacy requirements. There have been studies that
the utility of published dataset can lead to privacy breach [22, 32],
however, they focus on partition-based methods for ℓ-diversity and
they have pointed out the problems while no solution is proposed.
Randomization technique has been used in previous works in pri-
vacy preservation. The usefulness of such a technique is shown
in [3], where the published data is used to build a decision tree
which achieves classification accuracy comparable to the accuracy
of classifiers built with the original data. An effective reconstruc-
tion method for data perturbation is introduced in [2]. In [4], ran-
dom perturbation is adopted for privacy preserving computation
for multidimensional aggregates in data horizontally partitioned at
multiple clients. Randomization of transaction datasets for the min-
ing of association rules has been considered in [19].
11. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a new mechanism in the problem of privacy
preserving data publication with the following properties. Firstly,
it satisfies ℓ′-diverted zero-differential privacy, which makes sure
that the resulting data analysis will have no difference whether an
individual keeps its true sensitive value or swap the true value with
other individuals. Secondly, the randomization process makes use
of the law of large numbers in ensuring that large counts, which are
not as sensitive, can be estimated with high accuracies while the
small counts will be hidden by relatively large errors. Our method
is parameter free except for the value of ℓ′, however, the choice of
ℓ′ has little effect on the privacy and as shown in our experiments,
setting ℓ′ to 5 or above will do well in terms of the utilities. Fur-
thermore, the sensitive value of a tuple in the published data can
be any value in the attribute domain, so the mechanism is resilient
to auxiliary knowledge which eliminates possible values. Our em-
pirical studies on a real dataset show superior utility performance
compared to other state-of-the-art methods which do not have the
above guarantees. For future work, we may consider how to handle
skewed sensitive microdata [36]. Another direction for future work
is to consider mechanisms such as small domain randomization for
further boosting the utilities for large counts [7]. The consideration
of sequential data releases is another open problem.
As a final remark, all existing privacy models inherently release
information that can be derived from the published datasets, and the
same is true with our approach. It is important to make known to
the users what kind of information they should expect to be released
or derivable. In our case, it will be relatively accurate answer to
queries with large sums.
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